Upon recommendation of the Nomination, Remuneration and Corporate Governance Committee, the Board of Directors’ meeting on February 24, 2010 defined the variable compensation of the Chief Executive Officer for 2009, determined the rules for the Chief Executive Officer’s variable compensation for 2010 and decided to grant to the Chief Executive Officer the benefit of a possible severance payment and a non-competition payment for which the terms were defined.

1. **Variable compensation for 2009 and 2010**

   a. **Reminder of the decisions of the Board of Directors’ meeting of July 29, 2009**

      After consultation with the “Comité des Sages” and upon recommendation of the Nomination, Remuneration and Corporate Governance Committee (NRCGC), the Board of Directors’ meeting on July 29, 2009 decided that the variable compensation that could be granted to Jacques Aschenbroich for the year 2009, prorata temporis given his appointment on March 20, 2009, would be determined according to:

      - quantitative criteria representing up to a maximum of 90% of the fixed compensation, including: (i) the Group’s liquidity and the renewal of credit lines, (ii) the Group’s free cash flow less restructuring costs and financial expenses, (iii) the Group’s operating margin to be positive in the second half, (iv) the EBITDA and (v) the amount of investments (physical investments and R&D efforts) during the fiscal year.

      - qualitative criteria representing up to a maximum of 30% of the fixed compensation, including: (i) the simplification and strengthening of the organization and (ii) the new strategy for Valeo for 2015.

      The maximum amount of Jacques Aschenbroich’s variable compensation was set at 120% of his fixed compensation: however, given the current economic circumstances, it had been decided that in the event that the application of these criteria would result in a variable compensation exceeding 60% of the fixed compensation, the variable part would be limited to 60% of the fixed compensation.

   b. **Decisions of the Board of Directors’ meeting of February 24, 2010 relating to the variable compensation of the Chief Executive Officer for 2009**

      During its meeting on February 24, 2010, the Board of Directors noted that the application of the predetermined criteria would result in a variable compensation for Jacques Aschenbroich exceeding 60% of his fixed compensation and therefore decided to limit the variable compensation due for the year 2009 to 60% of his fixed compensation, or 398,952 euros.

   c. **Decisions of the Board of Directors’ meeting of February 24, 2010 relating to the variable compensation of the Chief Executive Officer for 2010**

      At its meeting on February 24, 2010, the Board of Directors decided that the variable compensation that could be awarded to Jacques Aschenbroich for the year 2010 would be determined according to:

      - quantitative criteria including: (i) operating margin, (ii) operating cash, (iii) Group order intake, and (iv) net income.

      - qualitative criteria including: (i) the quality of financial communication and (ii) the implementation of the strategy.

      The amount of the variable part as a percentage of the base fixed compensation would be determined as follows:

      - operating margin: 0 to 30%;
      - operating cash: 0 to 15 %;
      - order intake: 0 to 20%;
      - net income: 0 to 15%.
For the qualitative criteria, the quality of financial communication could represent 0 to 15% and the implementation of the strategy 0 to 25% of the fixed compensation.

The maximum amount of Jacques Aschenbroich’s variable compensation for 2010 would be 120% of his fixed compensation.

2. **Severance payment and non-competition payment**

   a. *Decisions of the Board of Directors’ meeting of February 24, 2010 relating to the severance payment of the Chief Executive Officer*

The Board of Directors’ meeting on February 24, 2010, upon recommendation of the NRCGC and after consultation with the “Comité des Sages”, decided to grant Jacques Aschenbroich the benefit of a severance payment that could be attributed in the event of a non-voluntary departure linked to a change in control or strategy (except in the event of serious professional misconduct).

The amount of this payment would be adjusted according to the year of departure, as follows:

- 6 months of compensation (fixed and variable) for a non-voluntary departure in 2010;
- 12 months for a non-voluntary departure in 2011;
- 18 months for a non-voluntary departure in 2012; and
- 24 months for a non-voluntary departure in 2013.

This severance payment would also be conditional on the following performance criteria:

- payment at least twice in the three previous years of all or part of the exceptional target-based bonus;
- achievement of a positive net income during the last fiscal year;
- achievement of an operating margin in the last fiscal year exceeding 3.6%;
- achievement of a gross margin in the last fiscal year exceeding 16%;
- achievement of an order intake to original equipment sales ratio exceeding 1.3 on average during the two previous fiscal years (or the last fiscal year if termination after one year).

The compensation taken into account for calculating the severance payment will be the average compensation (fixed and variable) paid during the two fiscal years preceding the year in which the termination occurs (or during the previous year in the event of termination in 2010), the compensation for 2009 being calculated on an annualized basis.

The total amount payable as a severance would be calculated as follows:

- if 5 criteria achieved: Jacques Aschenbroich would receive 100% of the amounts concerned;
- if 4 criteria achieved: Jacques Aschenbroich would receive 80% of the amounts concerned;
- if 3 criteria achieved: Jacques Aschenbroich would receive 60% of the amounts concerned;
- if 2 criteria achieved: Jacques Aschenbroich would receive 100% of the amounts concerned;
- if less than 2 criteria achieved: Jacques Aschenbroich would receive 0% of the amounts concerned.

The Board would reduce by 20% the amount resulting from the above calculations if a major plan affecting employment is implemented in the year preceding the date Jacques Aschenbroich’s term of office is terminated.

The severance payment would be paid as a lump sum within a maximum of one month following the review by the Board of Directors of the respect of the severance payment criteria.
b. Decisions of the Board of Directors’ meeting of February 24, 2010 relating to the non-competition payment of the Chief Executive Officer

The Board of Directors’ meeting on February 24, 2010, upon recommendation of the NRCGC and after consultation with the “Comité des Sages”, also proposed to have the possibility to subject Jacques Aschenbroich to a non-competition clause. Should this option be exercised by the Company, Jacques Aschenbroich would be forbidden, for 12 months following the termination of his function as Valeo’s Chief Executive Officer, regardless of the reason, to collaborate in any manner whatsoever with an automotive supplier or, more generally, with any company that is a competitor to Valeo.

This option, should it be exercised, would result in the payment of a non-competition payment to Jacques Aschenbroich amounting to 12 months of compensation (calculated on the same basis as compensation taking into account for the severance payment). This amount would be paid in equal monthly installments throughout the period covered by the non-competition clause.

A Company can always free the beneficiary from his non-competition obligation (in which case the non-competition payment will not be due).

Should a Company exercise this non-competition clause, the amount of the payment due would be charged against the severance payment. Thus, depending on the case, the maximum payment of compensation due to be paid to Jacques Aschenbroich in terms of non-competition and/or severance payment would be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Termination in Year</th>
<th>Non-voluntary departure with non-competition clause exercised</th>
<th>Non-voluntary departure with non-competition clause not exercised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>18 months</td>
<td>18 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>24 months</td>
<td>24 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Should the non-competition clause be exercised, Jacques Aschenbroich would receive as a minimum the amount of the non-competition payment, and the amount due for this payment and the severance payment would be paid: (i) for the amount due under the non-competition payment, in line with the payment rules defined for this case, (ii) for the surplus, should there be one, in line with the payment rules defined for the severance payment.